In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. Both are veritic types of luck on Pritchards viewthey are present when, given how one came to have ones true belief, it is a matter of luck that this belief is true (Pritchard 2005: 146). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. [] That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. This allows the agent to produce a slightly different mental representation of the subject matter that enables efficacious inferences pertaining to (or manipulations of) the subject matter. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Pragmatism as an epistemological approach accentuates the reasoning of theories and concepts by studying their consequences and goals, values and interests they support. Consider the view that the kinds of epistemic luck that suffice to undermine knowledge do not also undermine understanding. Khalifas (2013) view of understanding is a form of explanatory idealism. One helpful way to think about this is as follows: if one takes a paradigmatic case of an individual who understands a subject matter thoroughly, and manipulates the credence the agent has toward the propositions constituting the subject matter, how low can one go before the agent no longer understands the subject matter in question? Greco, J. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. Such a theory raises questions of its own, such as precisely what answering reliably, in the relevant sense, demands. ), Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures). However, Pritchards work on epistemic luck (for example, 2005) and how it is incompatible with knowledge leads him to reason that understanding is immune to some but not all forms of malignant luck (that is, luck which is incompatible with knowledge). Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. Finally, on the other side of the spectrum from Zagzebski and Kvanvig, and also in opposition with Pritchard, is the view that understandings immunity to epistemic luck is isomorphic to knowledges immunity to epistemic luck. Argues against a factive conception of scientific understanding. Grimm, S. Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515-535. In fact, he claims, the two come apart in both directions: yielding knowledge without strong cognitive achievement andas in the case of understanding that lacks corresponding knowledgestrong cognitive achievement without knowledge. A worry about this move can be put abstractly: consider that if understanding entails true beliefs of form , and that beliefs of form must themselves be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities, it might still be that ones reliable -generating abilities are exercised in a bad environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. epistemological shift pros and cons. For example, Carter and Gordon (2011) consider that there might be cases in which understanding, and not just knowledge, is the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. Contains a discussion of the fact that we often take ourselves to understand things we do not. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. Thus, given that understanding that p and knowing that p can in ordinary contexts be used synonymously (for example, understanding that it will rain is just to know that it will rain) we can paraphrase Zagzebskis point with no loss as: understanding X entails knowing that one understands X. Understanding entails that such beliefs must be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities. Is it problematic to embrace, for example, a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions while embracing, say, invariantism about understanding? For example, and problematically for any account of objectual understanding that relaxes a factivity constraint, people frequently retract previous attributions of understanding. Consider here an analogy: a false belief can be subjectively indistinguishable from knowledge. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. There is a common and plausible intuition that understanding might be at least as epistemically valuable as knowledgeif not more soand relatedly that it demands more intellectual sophistication than other closely related epistemic states. Sullivan, E. Understanding: Not Know-How. Philosohpical Studies (2017). Offers an account of understanding that requires having a theory of the relevant phenomenon. This in part for three principal reasons. He gives the name grasping* to the purely psychological component that would continue to be satisfied even if, say, an evil demon made it the case at the moment of your grasping that there was only an appearance of the thing that appears to you to be the case. An earlier paper defending the intellectualist view of know-how. The proponent of moderate factivity owes an explanation. This is not so obvious, and at least, not as obvious as it is in the case of knowledge. This view, embraced by DePaul and Grimm (2009), implies that to the extent that understanding and knowledge come apart, it is not with respect to a difference in susceptibility to being undermined by epistemic luck. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift Epistemology refers to a dynamic concept that shows how humans understand knowledge, which entails how it is received, classified, justified, and transmitted in distinctive ways and at different periods in history. Contrast thiscall it the intervening reading of the casewith Pritchards corresponding environmental reading of the case, where we are to imagine that the agent is reading a reliable academic book which is the source of many true beliefs she acquires about the Comanche. ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. According to Elgin, a factive conception of understanding neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. An overview of the background, development and recent issues in epistemology, including a chapter on understanding as an epistemic good. Must they be known or can they be Gettiered true beliefs? Kelps account, then, explains our attributions of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such well-connected knowledge. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. Divides recent views of understanding according to whether they are manipulationist or explanationst; argues for a different view according to which understanding is maximally well-connected knowledge. Khalifa, K. Is Understanding Explanatory or Objectual? Synthese 190(6) (2013a): 1153-1171. However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. 115, No. The underlying idea in play here is that, in short, thinking about how things would be if it were true is an efficacious way to get to further truths; an insight has attracted endorsement in the philosophy of science (for example, Batterman 2009). Boston: Routledge, 2013. Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support the arguments presented in the paper. This view, while insisting that central beliefs must all be true, is flexible enough to accommodate that there are degrees of understandingthat is, that understanding varies not just according to numbers of true beliefs but also numbers of false, peripheral beliefs. Most notably here is what we can call linguistic understandingnamely, the kind of understanding that is of particular interest to philosophers of language in connection with our competence with words and their meanings (see, for example, Longworth 2008). Summary This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Arguments Con Arguments Pro Ambivalence Concerning Relativism? Explores the pros and cons with at least 2 credible sources. Sliwa, P. IVUnderstanding and Knowing. Having abandoned the commitment to absolute space, current astronomers can no longer say that the Earth travels around the sun simpliciter, but must talk about how the Earth and the sun move relative to each other. Nonetheless, Zagzebski thinks that believing this actually allows us more understanding for most purposes than the vastly more complicated truth owing to our cognitive limitations. This line merits discussion not least because the idea that understanding-why comes by degrees is often ignored in favor of discussing the more obvious point that understanding a subject matter clearly comes by degrees. Epistemology is a way of framing knowledge, it defines how it can be produced and augmented. If the former, then this is unfortunate given the theoretical work the term is supposed to be doing in characterizing understanding. Strevens, however, holds that than an explanation is only correct if its constitutive propositions are true, and therefore the reformulation of grasping that he provides is not intended by Strevens to be used in an actual account of understanding. . For one thing, it is prudent to note up front that there are uses of understanding that, while important more generally in philosophy, fall outside the purview of mainstream epistemology. Salmon, W. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. In recent years epistemology has experienced gradual changes that are critical in human life. Thirdly, Kelp (2015) has an objection that he thinks all who favor a manipulationist line should find worrying. Khalifas indispensability argumentwhich he calls the Grasping Argument runs as follows: Khalifa is, in this argument stipulating that (1) is a ground rule for discussion (2013b: 5). Looks at understandings role in recent debates about epistemic value and contains key arguments against Elgins non-factive view of understanding. The cons of the epistemology shift that is a major concern to philosophers are the loss of, reading and communications since the student do not interact physically, these skills be instilled EPISTEMOLOGY SHIFT 5 by the teachers and through the help of physical environments. 824 Words. Furthermore, Section 3 considers whether characterizations of understanding that focus on explanation provide a better alternative to views that capitalize on the idea of manipulating representations, also giving due consideration to views that appear to stand outside this divide. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Gettier, E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6) (1963). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. 1. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:3 (2010): 497-522. Defends views that hold explanation as indispensable for account of understanding and discusses what a non-factive account of grasping would look like. We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs that this individual has acquired from the book, and also that she can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that she is expressing the truth. That said, the question of whether, and if so to what extent, understanding is compatible with epistemic luck, lacks any contemporary consensus, though this is an aspect of understanding that is receiving increased attention. A longer discussion of the nature of understanding and its distinctive value (in relation to the value of knowledge) than in his related papers. Early defence of explanations key role in understanding. Suppose further that the agent could have easily ended up with a made-up and incorrect explanation because (unbeknownst to the agent) everyone in the vicinity of the genuine fire officer who is consulted is dressed up as fire officers and would have given the wrong story (whilst failing to disclose that they were merely in costume). But, the chief requirement of understanding, for him, is instead that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agents collection of information (that is, that the agent has a grasp of how all this related information fits together. De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. On the view he recommends, the ability to grasp explanatory or evidential connections is an ability that is central to understanding only if the relevant grasping ability is understood as involving reliable explanatory evaluation. He leaves grasping at the level of metaphor or uses it them literally but never develops it. A. and Gordon, E. C. On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2014): 1-14. ), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Working hypotheses and idealizations need not, on this line, be viewed as representative of realityidealizations can be taken as useful fictions, and working hypotheses are recognized as the most parsimonious theories on the table without thereby being dubbed as wholly accurate. On the one hand, we have manipulationists, who think understanding involves an ability (or abilities) to manipulate certain representations or concepts. Kvanvig, J. How should an account of objectual understanding incorporate these types of observationsnamely, where the falsity of a central belief or central beliefs appears compatible with the retention of some degree of understanding? ), Knowledge, Virtue and Action. Uses the concept of understanding to underwrite a theory of explanation. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. A discussion of whether linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0863-z. A novel interpretation of the traditional view according to which understanding-why can be explained in terms of knowledge of causes. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. CA: Wadsworth, 2009. Where is the Understanding? Synthese, 2015. So too does the fact that one would rather have a success involving an achievement than a mere success, even when this difference has no pragmatic consequences. As it turns out, not all philosophers who give explanation a central role in an account of understanding want to dispense with talk of grasping altogether, and this is especially so in the case of objectual understanding. Zagzebski notes that this easily leads to a vicious circle because neglect leads to fragmentation of meaning, which seems to justify further neglect and further fragmentation until eventually a concept can disappear entirely.. These retractions do not t seem to make sense on the weak view. Although, many commentators suggest that understanding requires something further, that is something in additional to merely knowing a proposition or propositions, Grimm thinks we can update the knowledge of causes view so that this intuition is accommodated and explained. More specifically, Kvanvig aims to support the contention that objectual understanding has a special value knowledge lacks by arguing that the nature of curiositythe motivational element that drives cognitive machinery (2013: 152)underwrites a way of vindicating understandings final value. More generally, though, it is important to note that Khalifa, via his grasping argument, is defending reliable explanatory evaluation as merely a necessarythough not sufficientcomponent of grasping. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. A paper in which it is argued that (contrary to popular opinion) knowledge does not exclude luck. It is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge (Rayner, 2011).The fact that taking in knowledge has altered is evident in learning institutions today. endangered species in the boreal forest; etown high school basketball roster. Discusses the connection between curiosity and true belief. The distinctive aspects can be identified as human abilities to engage in mathematics and intellectual reasoning. In this respect, then, Kvanvigs view achieves the result of a middle ground. Hazlett, A. Firstly, grasping is often used in such a way such that it is not clear whether it should be understood metaphorically or literally. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Whitcomb, D. Wisdom. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. Morris challenges the assumption that hearers cannot gain understanding through the testimony of those who lack understanding, and accordingly, embraces a kind of understanding transmission principle that parallels the kind of knowledge transmission principle that is presently a topic of controversy in the epistemology of testimony. Specifically, a very weak view of understandings factivity does not fit with the plausible and often expressed intuition that understanding is something especially epistemically valuable. London: Routledge, 2009. The context-sensitive element of Wilkenfelds account of understanding allows him to attribute adequate understanding to, for example, a student in an introductory history class and yet deny understanding to that student when the context shifts to place him in a room with a panel of experts. A more charitable interpretation of Bakers position would be to read making reasonable sense more strongly. A good example here is what Riggs (2003) calls intelligibility, a close cousin of understanding that also implies a grasp of order, pattern and connection, but does not seem to require a substantial connection to truth. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. A second reason that adverting to grasping-talk in the service of characterizing understanding raises further question is that it is often not clarified just what relationships or connections are being grasped, when they are grasped in a way that is distinctive of understanding. Epistemology is a branch in philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. Decent Essays. Relatedly, if framed in terms of credence, what credence threshold must be met, with respect to propositions in some set, for the agent to understand that subject matter?
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